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ABSTRACT 
In this special issue introduction, we briefly describe a variety of research paths 
researchers have followed to study the multifaceted phenomenon of corruption. 
Furthermore, we classify the papers included in this special issue according to their 
contribution to these research paths and briefly preview them. Finally, drawing on 
these four research paths and the papers included in this special issue, we propose a 
six-item agenda for future research on corruption. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a major problem in much of the world. It often prevents economic 
development, causes inefficiency and unfairness in the distribution of resources, can 
be the underlying factor behind corporate failures and industry crises, can erode the 
social fabric of societies, and can have other major negative impacts in the wellbeing 
of individuals and societies. Therefore, many international agencies, ranging from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United 
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Nations, to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, are engaging in 
different activities aimed at the reduction of corruption in both business and 
government organizations. We can better understand the significance of corruption by 
identifying four co-evolving trends that have been taking place in the last decades. 
First, corruption has been found to have severe negative impacts on societies, 
businesses and individuals. As many studies have repeatedly shown, corruption adds 
to the cost of doing business, diverts funds from those most in need, and can be the 
cause of financial crises (Burke & Tomlinson, 2016; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010). 
Second, national governments have been increasing the regulations that corporations 
have to comply with, some of which have extra-territorial jurisdiction (i.e. US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act; UK Bribery Act). Third, the fines that the various regulatory 
bodies impose on business corporations for engaging in corrupt activities or not 
complying with regulations have been increasing at a “dramatic” level (Kaminski, 
2016). Fourth, the corresponding dramatic growth of compliance departments in 
many corporations, often after they suffered from major scandals (i.e. Siemens), 
indicates that corporations are taking corruption issues seriously. In discussions that 
one of the guest editors has had with compliance professionals, it seems that 
compliance departments increasingly see their function expanding from simply 
demonstrating “legal compliance” to include the “prevention of corruption and other 
kinds of financial crime.” However, in spite of their many efforts to reduce 
corruption, the phenomenon we refer to, as “corruption” appears to persist and is 
casting a long shadow on many organizations, both private and governmental. 
Therefore, as researchers, it is of great importance that we continue to study 
corruption so that we can better understand it and find ways to prevent it from 
damaging our societies. 
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But, before we proceed to discuss the topic of corruption research, we should 
address the issue of what corruption is and note its complexity. Transparency 
International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International, 2011). Similarly, Ashforth et al. (2008, 671) define 
corruption as “the illicit use of one’s position of power for perceived personal or 
collective gain.” We believe we should enrich and expand this definition by 
differentiating between first- and second-order corruption. First-order corruption 
refers to the abuse of power within existing systems or rules or norms that individuals 
abuse for their own benefit, whereas second-order corruption where executives use 
their power to unfairly re-write and shape the organization’s norms and regulations in 
their favor (Zyglidopoulos, 2016). However, beyond expanding the definition of 
corruption, we must emphasise the fact, often ignored, that corruption is a very rich, 
complex, multidimensional construct, embedded in different ways in different 
cultures and refers to many kinds of activities. 
In the last decades, then, given the importance and multifaceted nature of 
corruption, researchers have increasingly allocated more attention to corporate and 
non-corporate corruption. In particular, in dealing with corruption, researchers have 
followed four different research paths, which have not always communicated 
adequately with each other. Communication between researchers following different 
research paths is partially hindered by the fact that different scholars engage in 
corruption research at different levels of analysis (i.e. individual, organization, 
industry, country), follow different methodologies (i.e. case studies, ethnographic 
research, econometric modeling), and often base their research on different 
ontological assumptions (i.e. does corruption have the same meaning globally). 
However, it is necessary for scholars belonging to different research traditions to 
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better communicate with each other, if we are to achieve a more sophisticated and 
complex understanding of corruption and improve our ability to prevent it.  
In this special issue, our purpose is not only to renew and extend the research 
agenda around corporate corruption, so that we can contribute towards a more 
sophisticated and complex understanding, but also to facilitate communication 
between different researchers. For this special issue, we received thirty-nine excellent 
papers, some of which benefited from being presented and discussed at an EGOS 
subtheme, entitled “Shadows of Organizational Corruption – Renewing the Agenda,” 
in Naples 2016. We finally accepted eleven papers, which the reviewers and we 
thought made significant and novel contributions. 
In the remainder of this article, we identify a number of research agenda paths 
that scholars who study corruption have followed over the years; preview the papers 
included in this special issue according to the research path they contribute towards; 
and suggest a research agenda for future contributions. 
 
CORRUPTION RESEARCH PATHS 
Given the richness and complexity of corruption research, we try to impose some 
tentative order by identifying four research paths that scholars have followed in 
studying corruption. We do not pretend that our depiction of corruption research here 
is a complete or systematic literature review on the matter, but we do try to put some 
order in the field by identifying these four research strands, which we find useful in 
discussing our proposed research agenda and the contributions of the papers included 
in this special issue. We use examples to illustrate the kind of research works we 
think illustrate each research path, without claiming these works are the most 
important ones in their field. In brief, we identify four research paths, which study 
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corruption in: (1) individuals, (2) organizations and industries, (3) different countries 
(mostly from an economic development perspective), and (4) different cultural 
context (from an anthropological perspective). 
 
(1) Corruption and individuals 
How do managerial actions contribute to corruption? Can a leader stop corruption? 
How does corruption in a team develop and spread? How do individual emotions 
contribute to corruption? How do individuals rationalize their behavior? How can 
managers prevent first- and second-order corruption? 
Drawing on a rich research tradition of social psychology and criminology, 
researchers within this domain have investigated the motives, contexts, 
rationalizations, and characteristics of individuals, who engage in corrupt activities. 
For example, drawing on an existing stream of research in social psychology 
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Sykes & Matza, 1957) Anand, 
Ashforth, and Joshi (2004) identified a number of rationalizations that individuals 
within organizations often use to avoid seeing themselves as corrupt. Another 
example of research in this category is part of the work done by Albrecht, Wernz, and 
Williams (1995), who in describing why individuals engage in fraudulent activities, 
identify the fraud triangle, consisting of pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations.  
Contributing to this research path, in this special issue, De Klerk expands on 
this insight, in his “The Devil Made Me Do It: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the 
Unconscious ‘Devils Within’ of Rationalized Corruption.” De Klerk extends the fraud 
triangle by elaborating six types of rationalizations for corruption. These connect well 
to the motives, rationalizations, and escalation processes we will return to in the 
“Identify specific corrupt practices” portion of our proposed research agenda.  
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(2) Corruption of organizations and industries          
What are the organizational antecedents and/or consequences of corruption? What 
are the processes through which corruption appears, is maintained and spreads? 
How can corruption be avoided or managed once it appears? Are there 
organizational structures/cultures/routines that reduce the likelihood of corruption? 
How can organizations manage the process of creating fair rules and norms? How 
does corruption erode competitive advantage? 
A second research path followed by many researchers investigates corruption 
at the level of organizations or industries. Researchers investigating corruption at 
these levels of analysis usually try to understand the antecedents, consequences of 
corruption, and the evolution over time (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008) of what 
Palmer (2008) refers to as “collective corruption” at the organizational level. Also 
Lounsbury and Hirsch (2010), in a volume they edited collect a number of papers 
partially dealing with the role corporate corruption played in the 2008 US financial 
market crisis. Work in this path is often very much connected to and builds on the 
path above, which deals with individuals within organizations and corruption. For 
example, the work by Anand et al. (2004) contributes to both because in addition to 
their discussing rationalizations, at the individual level, they also discuss how 
corruption spreads and is perpetuated within organizations through socialization 
tactics and other organizational facilitating factors. 
In this special issue, four articles fit into this research path. The article by 
Clemente & Gabbioneta on “How Does the Media Frame Corporate Scandals? The 
Case of German Newspapers and the Volkswagen Diesel Scandal” and Schwartz’s 
portrayal of discourse utilized in the false billing practices of university hospitals in 
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her “From the Ordinary to Corruption in Higher Education” provide excellent 
examples of how organizations’ leaders can knowingly initiate corrupt activities to 
“beat the system.” Executives having the knowledge and skills to do so, as in these 
examples, will be further addressed in the “Corruption as capability” portion of our 
proposed research agenda. In the article titled “Moral Accounting by Organizations: 
A Process Study of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” by Murphy, 
Patvardhan and Gehman, the authors use an inductive approach to understand the 
process through which organizations are seen as morally accountable for events that 
led to crises. They focus on the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and their 
findings indicate that moral accountability is negotiated via an iterative, discursive 
process. Moreover, contributing to both research paths concerning individuals and 
firms/industries, the essay titled “The Corruption Norm,” by Nelson, discusses the 
fact that misconduct in some industries becomes so widespread that it becomes the 
new norm. 
 
(3) Corruption and economic development          
What field level dynamics are associated with widespread corruption? Can 
corruption become institutionalized in a field? If so, how does an illegitimate 
behavior become institutionalized? What forms of institutional work are associated 
with stopping corruption? How do institutional entrepreneurship and/or institutional 
work relate to corruption?  Are some industries more prone to corruption than 
others? 
Within the economic development and political science domain, many 
researchers have investigated the role that political and bureaucratic corruption plays 
in developing countries and particularly the role it plays in economic development 
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(d’Agostino, Dunne, & Pieroni, 2016; Sepehrdoust & Berjisian, 2016). An interesting 
idea that emerged in this, mostly unknown within the field of business, line of 
research is the identification of different kinds of corruption that have different impact 
on the development of a country (Rock & Bonnett, 2004; Wedeman, 1997). For 
example, in comparing the impact of corruption between three different developing 
countries, Wedeman (1997) differentiated between looters, rent-scrapers, and 
dividend-collectors, which he found had different impact on their respective country’s 
development. 
The three contributions which fit within this category in this special issue are: 
“A Bitter Pill: Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Anti-Bribery Compliance 
in the Pharmaceuticals Sector” by Yakis-Douglas, David-Barrett, Moss, & Nguyen; 
“Understanding Contextual ‘Readiness’ for Achieving Institutional Breakthroughs: A 
Study of the Fight Against Corruption in Brazil” by Castro & Ansari; and the 
interview with “Anna Hazare: A Corruption Crusader and his Grassroots Wisdom,” 
by Chowdhury, Banerjee & Deepak. Yakis-Douglas et al. clearly lay out the 
difficulties encountered by sales representatives of US and British companies in 
developing countries to follow company rules against providing gifts and bribes when 
a nation’s purchasing agents expect them, and sales reps from other nations are not so 
restrained. In his recounting the “car wash” investigations of national corruption 
surrounding Brazil’s Paribus Corporation, Castro and Ansari develop an extension of 
institutional theory to take context more into account when following how large-scale 
corruption gets investigated. In the interview with corruption fighter Anna Hazare, 
Chowdhury et al. bring us views and insights from one of India’s most famous leaders 
in that nation’s fight against corruption among government officials in all regions of 
the country. 
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(4) Corruption in different cultural and societal contexts        
How do cultural and societal factors affect corruption in organizations? How does 
corruption in organizations affect government and civil society? How does the 
existence of elites affect the dynamics of corruption? What is the role of generalized 
social trust in determining the level of corruption within a society? What are the 
micro and macro consequences of corruption? 
Drawing mostly on anthropology, a number of researchers investigate the 
causes and consequences of corruption as they occur and make sense in different 
cultural contexts. As Torsello and Venard (2016) maintain, mostly though detailed 
ethnographic studies, this perspective provides important insights into the different 
meanings that corruption can have in different cultures. For example, Ledeneva 
(2008) compares the notions of blat and guanxi, which are often seen as corrupt by 
western cultures, in Russia and China respectively, and investigates how such 
practices are used to obtain scarce goods and services. Moreover, Orjuela (2014) 
describes the role that corruption plays in Nigeria, Kenya, and Sri Lanka in the ability 
of people to construct and contest their identity. 
In this special issue, three articles fit within this research path. First, in a 
dramatic instance of how this plays out in different cultural contexts is Pelly’s 
description, in his “Story of Captain Baby-Face and the Coffee Maker: An 
Entrepreneurial Narrative Perspective on Corruption,” of how a small gift opened and 
enabled discussion between US officers in Iraq and tribal leaders. Second, Anderson, 
in her article titled “Of Great Vampire Squids and Jamming Blood Funnels: A 
Socially Constructed and Historically Situated Perspective on Organizational 
Corruption,” proposes that corruption is not only socially constructed but also 
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historically situated. To offer a way to articulate organizational corruption as an 
eventful conception, she draws on the well-publicized accusation of corruption by 
Goldman Sachs. Third, Slager, in her article titled “The Discursive Construction of 
Corruption Risk,” investigates how accountants, in their discourse aimed at private 
sector audiences, construct the concept of anti-corruption risk.  
 
PROPOSED RESEARCH AGENDA 
Looking forward, we identify here a six-fold research agenda, which we believe 
would help advance our understanding of corruption and, we hope, improve the 
communication between researchers following different research paths. 
(1) Focusing on specific corrupt practices: Corruption includes a variety of 
activities such as bribing, fraud, padding one’s expenses, altering financial 
documents, discriminating on characteristics such as sex, race or ethnicity, and more. 
The fact that all of these types of activities illustrate the “abuse of power for personal 
gain” idea does not mean that studying them as a homogeneous phenomenon is 
always beneficial. It is possible that the motives, rationalizations, escalation 
processes, and damages of different kinds of corrupt activities differ substantially. An 
approach where we study specific corrupt activities could provide researchers and 
practitioners with a more fine-grained understanding of corruption and therefore more 
effective ways to prevent it or stop it before it grows. 
  (2) Context matters: The multimillionaire minister of an oil rich country who 
steals millions of dollars from the public to buy houses around the world he does not 
really need, represents a dramatically different kind of corruption from the lowly paid 
police officer of the same country who pretends your car light is broken and asks for a 
trivial, by western standards, bribe to help feed his family, because his salary is not 
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enough. This distinction has been discussed in the relevant literature as “grand” and 
“petty” corruption (Nystrand, 2014) and it clearly illustrates the difference that 
context makes. We cannot assume it away, if we want to understand and prevent 
corrupt activities from taking place. We need to understand the context that makes the 
corrupt activity “make sense” for those involved. Such an understanding will help 
with preventive measures and help regulators and corporations to find the most 
efficient and effective ways to prevent corruption from taking place. Therefore, 
researchers should try to better understand how a corrupt act “fits” within a particular 
cultural and institutional context, and its purpose, motivation, function, and so on. It is 
easy to discard corrupt activities as unethical and dismiss them without understanding 
the context in which they developed and are evolving. For example, in some countries 
where corruption is widespread, bribery up to a certain level is considered acceptable 
and “corruption” is going beyond that. Examining when behavior has gone “over the 
line” enough to be seen as corrupt would be an interesting topic for future research. 
Considering in what types of environments a particular corrupt act is more likely to be 
accepted as “normal” versus abnormal and punishable would also be interesting. 
What variations are found in different nations’ laws, customs, institutional 
arrangements and degrees of enforcement? 
(3) Second-order corruption: As mentioned above, we would like to enrich the 
definition of corruption by differentiating between first- and second- corruption, a 
distinction that can and has been applied beyond the organizational level 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2016) to the country level of analysis. At the country/state level, 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) discuss the notion of “state capture,” which 
they define as the efforts of business firms to alter their surrounding institutional 
environment so that they can benefit. Research dealing with this kind of corruption is 
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rather sparse, but given that this kind of corruption can cause serious, long-term 
damage (Zyglidopoulos, 2016), it is important for researchers to expand their 
understanding of “corruption” to include second-order corruption and state capture 
phenomena. Moreover, some of the activities involved here might be immoral and 
corrupt, but not necessarily illegal. 
(4) Corruption as capability: There is an old English saying that “it takes a thief 
to catch a thief,” a saying we think also applies to the study of corruption. In other 
words, we need to perceive matters from the perspective of the corrupt individual or 
organization, if we are to become able to prevent corrupt activities from taking place. 
A lot of work has been done on the motives, opportunities, and rationalizations that 
contribute to corrupt activities. This has improved our ability to prevent corrupt 
activities at different levels, up to a point. But all these systems, regulations and codes 
of ethics are obstacles that individuals or organizations determined (or desperate) 
enough to engage in corrupt activities can overcome by improving their corruption 
related capabilities. We have then to study corruption as a capability and address 
issues such as, what are the specific skills that make an individual or an organization 
capable of engaging  “successfully” in corruption? What are the skills or capabilities 
that enable individuals or organizations to cover their tracks and benefit from corrupt 
activities? How do individuals or organizations develop such skills? Along those lines 
is the work of Crane (2013), who investigates the phenomenon of modern slavery as a 
management practice and examines how firms develop capabilities that allow them to 
simultaneously take advantage of slavery and insulate themselves from the 
illegitimacy associated with it.  
(5) From corruption to scandal: As Hirsch and Milner (2016) point out, quite 
often when a scandal erupts the public’s reaction is often enough a “it’s about time.” 
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This means that in such cases the underlying corruption was relatively well known, 
but had not erupted into a scandal. This is a very interesting venue for future research, 
because it means that either some kinds of corrupt activities can “pass under the 
radar,” or are relatively acceptable for long periods of time. In other words, one could 
ask, under what conditions do some corrupt activities, known to many, go unnoticed 
at the society level? Is it that there are social mechanisms that select certain kinds of 
corrupt activities to evolve into scandals, where others go on relatively undisturbed? 
Is the public characterized by an “attention span” effect where only so many scandals 
can be noticed at a point in time? Are there particular social agents who control this 
process?  
(6) Learning to be corrupt: Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm that in 2002 
had to surrender its licenses to practice because of its engagement in corruption, 
which led to criminal convictions, started out about a century earlier as a firm 
characterized by professionalism and integrity – attributes which it maintained and 
exemplified for many decades (Toffler & Reingold, 2004). However, in 2002 it had to 
surrender its license to practice because it was corrupt. How did such a firm go from 
being a paragon of professionalism and integrity to having to close its doors because 
of corruption? Toffler and Reingold (2004) provide a fascinating narrative to that 
question. But such a question could be asked in a different way for many firms, in 
other words, one could ask, how do firms learn to be corrupt? 
Organizational learning has a very long and rich research history (Argote, 2011; 
Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Berends & Antonacopoulou, 2014; Levitt & March, 
1988; Starbuck, 1992) studying changes in beliefs/cognitions and/or actions/behaviors 
of organizations and individuals (Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Nicolini, 2000). This 
extensive and rich literature predominantly perceives “learning” as something positive 
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that leads to improved organizational performance. However, if we broaden this 
notion of learning to include negative routines, behaviors, and cognitions, the 
organizational learning literature could offer a lot to our study of corruption, by 
helping researchers understand how organizations “learn” to be corrupt over time. In 
other words, we suggest here, that the literature of organizational learning can and 
should be applied to studying how some organizations become corrupt over time. One 
could study the evolution of corruption in organizations by investigating how 
organizations (or individuals within them) change their beliefs/cognitions, introduce 
and retain new corrupt routines, acquire knowledge related to the implementation of 
corrupt activities, and create knowledge reservoirs for corrupt routines. 
 
 In closing, we would like to highlight the need for what Rousseau (2011) 
refers to as an interdisciplinary and multilevel perspective. Rousseau (2011) maintains 
that such a perspective is necessary for the study of organizational phenomena that 
draw and have been investigated by multiple disciplines (i.e. psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, management, economics, or political science) and operate across levels. 
Corruption is such a phenomenon. Therefore if we are to better understand it and 
come to better prevent it, we need to engage is such interdisciplinary and multilevel 
research. The first such multilevel study dealing with corruption, in addition to an 
array of other topics, was Plato’s Republic (1989), where he examined the notion of 
justice at the level of the individual and society. This highlights the fact that 
corruption has been with us for more than two thousand years and will most likely 
remain with us for a very long time. We have to find then innovative ways of studying 
it, so that we can limit the damage that it can have to our organizations and societies.  
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